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Insurance, and Supplemental Revenue
Assistance: Interactions and Overlap for
Illinois and Kansas Farm Program Crops
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Farm-level data from Illinois and Kansas for the 1991–2007 crops are used to examine the
interaction and overlap among crop revenue insurance, Supplemental Revenue Assistance
(SURE), and Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE). Compared with 75% Crop Revenue
Coverage Insurance (75% CRCP), ACRE provides more payments and has a greater impact
on minimum farm revenue for the Illinois farms. In contrast, for the Kansas farms, 75%
CRCP has the greater impact. SURE’s relative impact on the Illinois and Kansas farms de-
pends on the metric. The overlap in payments from ACRE and 75% CRCP resulting from
covering the same part of the revenue risk distribution is estimated to be less than 5% of
ACRE payments. Several proposals for improving the farm safety net are discussed.
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The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of
2008 (2008 Farm Bill) (U.S. Congress, 2008)
authorized two new programs designed to help
farmers manage risk. One is Supplemental
Revenue Assistance (SURE). SURE is awhole-
farm crop disaster assistance program tied to
crop insurance for insurable crops and to the
noninsured Crop Assistance Program (NAP)
for noninsurable crops. Eligibility for SURE
requires the occurrence of a disaster that ad-
versely affects production, but, in a key differ-
ence with ad hoc disaster assistance programs
previously authorized byCongress, payments are
based on shortfalls in revenue relative to crop
insurance guarantees.
The second new program is Average Crop
Revenue Election (ACRE). Farm program partic-
ipants can choose ACRE or a traditional program
suite. The traditional suite consists of the fixed
directpayment,marketingloan,andpricecounter-
cyclical programs. The ACRE suite consists of
80% of the traditional program’s direct payments,
a marketing loan at 70% of the traditional pro-
gram’sloanrate,andanewstaterevenueprogram.
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ACRE all address revenue risk, concern has
arisen abouttheirinterrelationships,inparticular
overlap between revenue insurance and ACRE.
This article examines the interrelationships
among the three programs. Specifically, pay-
ments are calculated using stylized versions of
the programs that capture key policy parameters
and farm-level data from Illinois and Kansas
for the 1991–2007 crops. Also examined is the
impact of the payments on farm revenue risk. To
allow us to focus on these performance charac-
teristics, we do not model the signup decision of
producers, but instead assume that all farmers
participate in the stylized versions of crop rev-
enue insurance, SURE, and ACRE.
Key parameters of SURE and ACRE are dis-
cussed in the next two sections. The two programs
then are compared with each other and with crop
revenue insurance. The analytical procedures are
p r e s e n t e df o l l o w e db yad i s c u s s i o no ft h ea n a -
lytical results. The concluding section focuses on
policy design issues and recommendations.
Overview of SURE
SURE is a whole-farm crop disaster assistance
program (U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA), Farm Service Agency (FSA), 2010).
The whole farm includes all farmland in all
counties regardless of tenure status. Three eli-
gibility conditions exist. Economically signifi-
cant crops on the farm must be covered by crop
insurance or enrolled in the noninsured Crop
Assistance Program (NAP). An economically
significant crop accounts for at least 5% of the
whole crop farm’s expected revenue. The farm
must have acres in a county declared a disaster
county by the Secretary of Agriculture or con-
tiguous to such a county or production on the
farm, as measured by total revenue, declines by
50% or more resulting from a natural disaster.
1
Last, a 10% production loss, as measured by
quantity, must occur for at least one economi-
cally significant crop on the farm as a result of
a natural disaster.
For the sake of simplicity, the following
discussion assumes that the farm plants only
insurable crops, that each crop meets the defi-
nition of an economically significant crop, and
that the farmer purchases Crop Revenue Cov-
erage Insurance for all crops on the farm.
(1) SURE payment for whole crop farm j and
crop year t 5 (60%  [SURE revenue guar-
anteejt – SURE total crop revenuejt])
(2) SURE total crop revenuejt 5 S(MAX[insur-
ance indemnitiesjt – producer paid pre-
miumsjt, 0], prevented planting paymentsjt,
other Federal disaster aid for same lossjt,
15% of direct paymentsjt, counter-cyclical
paymentsjt, ACRE paymentsjt,m a r k e t i n g
loan paymentsjt, crop valuejst), where:
(3) Crop valuejst for crop s 5 (harvested acresjst 
yieldjst  U.S. crop marketing year pricest
adjusted for applicable disaster-related local
or regional quality losses or disaster-related
excess moisture)
SURE revenue guaranteejt is the sum of the
SURE revenue guarantee for each crop, where:
(4) SURE revenue guarantee for crop s on whole
cropfarmj andcrop year t5 {(plantedacresjst
1 prevented planted acresjst)  insurance
coverage leveljst  MAX[actual production his-
tory (APH insurance) yieldjst, counter-cyclical
payment yieldjst]  MAX[base insurance pri-
cejst, harvest insurance pricejst]  115%}
2
SURE revenue guarantee for whole crop
farm j and crop year t cannot exceed 90% of the
farm’s expected revenue, which is the sum of
the expected revenue for each crop on the farm,
where:
(5) SURE expected revenue for crop s on whole
crop farm j in crop year t 5 {(planted
1Disasters include damaging weather such as
drought, excessive moisture, excessive heat, hail,
freeze, and weather-related irrigation water rationing;
other adverse natural occurrences such as earthquakes
and related conditions that occur as a result of the
preceding natural events and exacerbate the condition
of the crop such as disease.
2The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
of 2009 increased the multiplicative factor from 115
to 120 percent for the 2008 program for crops with
insurance policies providing at least 70% yield cover-
age and 100% price coverage (USDA, FSA, 2010).
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MAX[APH insurance yieldjst, counter-cy-
clical payment yieldjst]  MAX[base in-
surance pricejst, harvest insurance pricejst]}
Equations 1–4 reveal that, once its eligibil-
ity conditions are met, SURE makes payments
for both low production and prices. Moreover,
payments by SURE are a subsidy to both buy
insurance and buy it at higher coverage levels.
As a simple illustration, when SURE’s eligi-
bility conditions are met and assuming only
one crop and the purchase of 75% coverage
insurance, SURE increases the farm’s coverage
level to 86.5% (75% times 115%).
SURE payments are limited to $100,000 per
eligible producer minus any payments from
these other three programs: Livestock In-
demnity, Livestock Forage Disaster, and
Emergency Assistance for Livestock, Honey
Bees, and Farm-Raised Fish.
Overview of ACRE
The 2008 Farm Bill gives farmers and land-
owners a choice between the traditional farm
program suite and an ACRE farm program
suite (USDA, FSA, 2009). Twenty-two crops
are eligible for election into ACRE, including
barley, corn, upland cotton, oats, peanuts, grain
sorghum, soybeans, and wheat. The unit of
election is a farm as recorded at the Farm
Service Agency (an FSA farm). As long as an
FSA farm is not in ACRE, election of ACRE
remains open. Once ACRE is elected, an FSA
farm is enrolled through the 2012 crop.
ACRE must be elected for all eligible crops
grown on a FSA farm, but payments are crop-
specific. An ACRE payment can occur if a
state’s actual revenue per planted acre is less
than the state’s revenue risk assistance level per
planted acre for a crop for a crop year where:
(6) ACRE revenue risk assistance level per
planted acre for state k, crop s, and crop year
t 5 (90%  Olympic average yield per
planted acre for 5 most recent prior crop
yearskst  average U.S. cash price for 2 most
recent prior crop yearsst).
(7) ACRE actual state revenue per planted acre
for state k, crop s, and crop year t 5 (yield
per planted acrekst  Max[U.S. cash pricest,
70% of U.S. marketing loan ratest])
ACRE’s state revenue risk assistance level
cannot increase more than 10% from the prior
year’s level (called a cap) nor decrease more
than 10% from the prior year’s level (called
a cup). The 10% cap and cup, along with the
use of historical moving averages, means that
the ACRE state revenue assistance level may
adjust more slowly than changes in market
revenue. However, no floor exists on the ACRE
assistance level.
An FSA farm eligibility condition exists.
Specifically, an FSA farm’s actual revenue
must be less than the FSA farm’s benchmark
revenue for the crop where:
(8) ACRE benchmark revenue per planted acre
for FSA farm i for crop s and crop year t 5
([Olympic average planted yield for 5 most
recent prior crop yearsist  average U.S. cash
price for 2 most recent prior crop yearsst] 1
per acre farmer-paid insurance premiumist)
(9) Actual revenue per planted acre for FSA
farm i for crop s and crop year t 5 (yield per
planted acreist  U.S. cash pricest)
An ACRE revenue payment is made to an
FSA farm for an eligible crop when both the
state payment condition and FSA farm eligi-
bility condition are met. The ACRE state rev-
enue payment per planted acre is capped at
25% of the state revenue risk assistance level.
(10) ACRE revenue payment for eligible FSA
farm i in state k for crop s and crop year
t 5 ([83.3% {85% for 2012 crop}  FSA
farm planted acresist]  MIN[ACRE state
revenue risk assistance level per planted
acrekst – actual state revenue per planted
acrekst, 25%  ACRE state revenue risk as-
sistance level per planted acre kst] [Olympic
average for 5 most recent prior FSA farm
yieldsist/Olympic average for 5 most recent
prior state yieldsjst])
Although ACRE revenue payments depend
on the acres planted to the eligible crop, a FSA
farm cannot receive ACRE payments on more
acres than the FSA farm’s total base acres. For
most eligible crops, planted acres equal the
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corn, oats, grain sorghum, and wheat, FSA de-
fined planted acres as harvested acres plus acres
reported as failed acres to FSA. Failed acres are
acres intended for harvest but not harvested.
For each payment entity, ACRE fixed direct
payments cannot exceed $32,000, or 20% less
than the $40,000 limit on traditional program
direct payments. For each payment entity,
ACRE revenue payments cannot exceed
$65,000, the limit on counter-cyclical pay-
ments plus an amount equal to the payment
entity’s 20% reduction in direct payments.
Comparison of Revenue Insurance, SURE,
and ACRE
Revenue insurance, SURE, and ACRE address
crop revenue risk. In contrast to the marketing
loan and counter-cyclical programs, their assis-
tancelevelsarenotfixedbutchangewithmarket
conditions, and no floor exists on revenue. Thus,
although revenue insurance, SURE, and ACRE
likely give farmers a longer time to adjust to
a longer-term decline in farm revenue, farmers
eventually will have to adjust to the decline.
Moreover, everything else constant, if revenue
insurance,SURE,orACREcausesproductionat
the market level to increase, the resulting de-
crease in price will translate into a lower assis-
tance level, thus mitigating at least some of the
increase in production.
Despite the similarities noted in the previous
paragraph, crop revenue insurance, SURE, and
ACRE differ on important parameters. One is
the unit of coverage. Revenue insurance can be
elected either at the individual field level, for
all acres planted to a crop within a county, or
at the county level. SURE’s unit of coverage is
thewhole-farm crop operation,whichcan extend
across county and state boundaries. ACRE’s unit
of coverage is the crop at the state level subject
to the FSA farm eligibility condition.
Differences exist in the period of coverage
and type of price used. Insurance addresses
revenue risks that occur between the two pe-
riods of time that determine 1) the average fu-
tures price used to set the revenue guarantee;
and 2) the average futures price used to calcu-
late the crop’s final value for payment
purposes. These two periods span a time from
before planting to harvest. SURE uses in-
surance’s preplant futures price to establish its
revenue guarantee but uses the U.S. crop mar-
keting year average cash price, with some ad-
justments, to calculate a crop’s final value for
payment purposes. SURE’s coverage period
thus spans both the crop’s growing season and
postharvest marketing year, but only if its three
eligibility conditions are met. ACRE only uses
U.S. crop marketing year cash prices. Hence,
ACRE’s period of coverage is the crop market-
ing year. However, it is important to note that
one factor determining crop year revenue is the
crop yield obtained during the growing season.
A fourth difference involves the mechanism
used to set the risk assistance level. Crop in-
surance/SURE’s coverage level is reset each
year based on the futures prices during in-
surance’s preplant price discovery period. In
contrast, a 10% cap and cup limits the annual
changes in ACRE’s state revenue risk assis-
tance level. On average, for nine large acreage
crops, crop insurance’s preplant price was 10%
or more below the prior year’s preplant price in
26% of the 1974–2009 crop years (see Figure
1). The range across the crops was 23–32%.
Thus,ACRE’s10%cupontheannualdeclinein
its assistance level is a potentially valuable risk
management feature that can result in ACRE
providing more protection than crop insurance/
SURE against larger declines in revenue that
last several years.
A fifth difference is the percent of revenue
covered. It determines the percent decline needed
to trigger a payment.For crop insurance, afarmer
elects this level. Maximum coverage level for
individual farm insurance is 85%. Coverage level
for county insurance is 90%. Assuming in-
dividual farm insurance,
3 SURE’s coverage level
is 115% of the insurance level elected by the
farmer with a cap at 90% of expected farm rev-
enue. ACRE’s coverage level is 90%.
The different parameters, which are sum-
marized in Table 1, may seem unnecessary or
3At the time this article was written, the relation-
ship between county insurance and SURE had not
been determined.
Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, August 2010 504confusing. However, they reflect in part the
different objectives of the programs. Crop rev-
enue insurance focuses primarily on the idio-
syncratic risk that a crop’s revenue declines for
an individual farm during the growing season.
SURE is a supplement to crop insurance that
extends its coverage to the crop marketing year
and the insurance deductible. Its focus is idio-
syncratic risk, but at the whole-farm crop level.
In contrast, ACRE’s focus is systemic risk, in
particular that crop marketing year revenue at
the state level declines for 1 to a short period of
years (Zulauf, Dicks, and Vitale, 2008). Never-
theless, the interrelationship, including overlap,
among the three programs is an issue.
Analytical Procedures
The analysis uses Illinois and Kansas farm level
data compiled by the Illinois Farm Business
Table 1. Comparison of Program Parameters for Crop Revenue Insurance, SURE, and ACRE
Program Parameter Revenue Insurance SURE
a ACRE
Area covered Individual field, or
enterprise, or county
Whole crop farm State but with a farm
eligibility condition
Prices used to set
assistance level Futures Futures U.S. marketing
year cash
Final value Futures U.S. marketing year cash U.S. marketing
year cash
Period covered Growing season Growing season and
marketing year
Marketing year
Cap on decline in
assistance level
None None 10%






up to 90% of expected
whole-farm crop revenue
90%
a At the time this article was written, the relationship between county crop insurance and SURE had not been determined.
Sources: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Farm Service Agency (2009, 2010) and U.S. Department of Agriculture, Risk
Management Agency (2010).
Figure 1. Share of Years in Which the Insurance Plant Price Declined at Least 10% from the Prior
Year’s Insurance Plant Price, Selected Crops, U.S., 1974–2009 Crop Years (Sources: original cal-
culation using data from the USDA, RMA, and a data set maintained at Kansas State University)
a Data for rice are for the 1987–2009 crop years.
b Data for spring wheat are for the 1975–2009 crop years.
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2009) and the Kansas Farm Management Asso-
ciation (KFMA) (Langemeier, 2009). FBFM is
a farmer-owned cooperative that has a working
relationship with the University of Illinois at
Urbana–Champaign. Farmer members maintain
production and financial records for their farm.
At the end of the calendar year, financial state-
ments and production records are prepared.
They can be used to assess farm and manage-
ment performance. In addition, aggregate data-
bases of crop and livestock production, receipts,
expenses, inventories, and capital accounts are
produced to create farm benchmarks. To be in-
cluded in the database, FBFM personnel must
certify a farm’s data are reliable and usable. The
data chosen for analysis cover periods over
which preparation of the data and computations
are consistent. The KFMA data are developed in
a similar fashion (Langemeier, 2005).
The historical period chosen for this analy-
sis depended on two considerations. One in-
volves a tradeoff. Specifically, a longer obser-
vation period translates into larger degrees of
freedom for an individual farm. However, farm
data tend not to be usable every year. Thus,
a longer observation period results in a smaller
number of farms available for analysis. The
second consideration is that the Federal Agri-
culture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996
eliminated annual land set asides; gave farmers
additional flexibility to make planting deci-
sions, except for restrictions on planting fruits,
vegetables, and wild rice on base acreage;
eliminated most public stocks programs; and
instituted fixed income payments (Nelson and
Schertz, 1996). These substantive policy
changes had implications for the impact of farm
programs on production decisions and market
prices (Orden, Paarlberg, and Roe, 1999;
Schertz and Doering, 1999). Thus, the 1996 and
later crop years are more representative of cur-
rent crop production incentives and market
conditions than years before 1996. Given these
two considerations, the observation period was
determined to be from 1991 through 2007 crop
years. The ending date was the last year for
which information was available when the study
began. The initial date means calculation of
program payments begin with the 1996 crop
year because 5 years are needed to calculate
a farm’s ACRE benchmark yield.
The Illinois and Kansas data sets were com-
piled somewhat differently because crop pro-
duction is more homogenous in Illinois than
Kansas. The Illinois data set was composed
of 560 farms that had complete, verified in-
formation for corn and soybeans for all of the
1991–2007 crop years. Wheat was included to the
extent information was available for the farm for
the current crop year and the 5 previous crop
years needed to calculate the farm’s ACRE
benchmarkyield. A total of 115 Illinois farms had
at least one observation for wheat. In contrast, the
Kansas data set was compiled by crop. Specifi-
cally, each farm had complete, verified data for
the crop for all of the 1991–2007 crop years. The
numbers of Kansas farms by crop were dryland
corn (103), irrigated corn (42), grain sorghum
(168), soybeans (235), and wheat (326). In total,
the Kansas data set contained 482 different farms.
The Illinois and Kansas data sets contain
planted acres and yield per planted acre. The 2007
Census of Agriculture reports values for harvested
acres. Thus, a direct comparison is not possible on
these metrics. Nevertheless, Table 2 presents the
comparison providing a perspective on the farms
analyzed in this study vs. all farms in the state.
Withtheexception ofirrigatedcorn inKansas, the
farms in this study had more acres of the crops
examined in this study than the farms enumerated
by the Census. Thus, on average, the farms in this
s t u d ya r em o s tl i k e l yl a r g e rt h a na l lf a r m si nI l -
linois and Kansas. The yields of the Illinois farms
in this study are higher than the corresponding
averages from the Census. Average yields for the
Kansas farms in this study are higher for dryland
corn and grain sorghum but lower for the other
three crops. The difference between planted and
harvested yield for Kansas wheat can be attrib-
uted in part to widespread freeze damage in
central and eastern Kansas in 2007, which resul-
ted in substantial nonharvested acres. In sum-
mary, when examined as a group, the differences
in acres and yields between the farms in this study
and the average in the Census of Agriculture
imply that the results of this study cannot be ex-
tended to farms not in this study.
The analysis is counterfactual. Revenue in-
surance, specifically Crop Revenue Coverage
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assumed to have existed during the 1996–2007
crop years. The traditional farm program suite
was assumed not to be available.
All acres were assumed to be enrolled in
CRCP at the 75% coverage level (subsequently
referred to as 75% CRCP). The preplant and
harvest insurance prices were obtained from the
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Risk Manage-
ment Agency or from a data set maintained at
Kansas State University (Kansas State Univer-
sity, Department of Agricultural Economics,
2009). The farm’s expected insurance yield was
an Olympic average of yields per planted acre
for the 5 immediately prior crop years, which is
also the farm’s ACRE benchmark yield. Final
crop value for insurance payment purposes was
calculated using the farm’s reported crop yield.
SURE payments were calculated following
Equations 1–4. To simplify the calculations,
crops eligible for SURE were assumed to be
only corn, grain sorghum, soybeans, and wheat
planted on the farm and each met the definition
of economic significance. No information was
available on quality losses. SURE’s cap on
coverage at 90% of a farm’s expected farm
income is not a constraint in this study because
115% of 75% is 86.25%.
Assuming that 75% CRCP was purchased
for all crop acres meant that SURE’s insurance
eligibility condition was satisfied. Its eligibility
condition of a 10% production loss on the farm
was modeled as: yield of at least one crop on
the farm must be less than 90% of its 5-year
Olympic moving average of the most recent
prior yields (i.e., the crop’s Actual Production
History (APH) insurance yield and ACRE
benchmark yield). Regarding SURE’s disaster
county eligibility condition, readily available
information could be found only for the 2005–
2008 calendar years. Over these 4 years, more
than 75% of the counties in Illinois, Kansas,
and all states weredeclared a disaster county by
the Secretary of Agriculture or were contiguous
to such a county (see Table 3). Given that di-
saster declarations are more likely in low-yield
years, that urban counties are probably less
likely to be declared agricultural disaster
counties because agricultural production is
limited, and that the incentive to have a county
declared an agricultural disaster county is
greater now that SURE exits, these data suggest
Table 2. Comparison of Farms Examined in this Study with the State Averages from the 2007
Census of Agriculture for Farms Growing the Crop, Illinois and Kansas, 2007
State and Crop










Corn for grain 569 187 342 172
Soybeans 368 51 244 43
Wheat 106 58 95 53
Kansas
b
Dryland corn for grainc 455 114 206 103
Irrigated corn for grainc 428 174 466 192
Grain sorghum for grain 261 83 231 77
Soybeans 472 29 196 32
Wheat 638 22 377 32
a Number of farms in the Illinois data set is 560. All planted corn and soybeans; 115 had enough information on wheat yields to
be included in the analysis for at least 1 of the 12 years.
b Number of farms in the Kansas data set is 482. Numbers of Kansas farms by crop are dryland corn (103), irrigated corn (42),
grain sorghum (168), soybeans (235), and wheat (326).
cFor Kansas corn, the Census of Agriculture numbers are for farms that irrigated all of their corn acres and for farms that did not
irrigate any of the corn acres.
Sources: Original calculations using data from the Illinois Farm Business FarmManagement (FBFM) program, the Kansas Farm
Management Association (KFMA), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistical Service 2007
Census of Agriculture.
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complete information is that a county will be
declared an agricultural disaster county or be
contiguous to such a county when farms are
likely to have below average yields. Thus, we
assumed that the disaster county declaration for
SURE eligibility was always met. Although this
assumption is not unreasonable, it means that our
estimate of SURE payments is on the high side.
ACRE state revenue payments were calcu-
lated using Equations 6 and 7, data from
USDA, National Agricultural Statistical Ser-
vice, plus state FSA failed acres for corn, grain
sorghum, and wheat.
4 ACRE’s farm eligibility
condition and ACRE payment to the farm were
calculated using Equations 8–10. The farm unit
in this analysis was the farm operation. A farm
operation can be composed of more than one
FSA farm, especially if the farm operation in-
cludes rented land. FSA farm data were not
available for the farms in this study.
Direct payments were estimated for each
county in Illinois and Kansas using data from
USDA, Economic Research Service (2009). Di-
rect payments were calculated for each crop us-
ing that crop’s base yields and base acres in the
county. Average direct payment per planted acre
in the county was calculated by weighting each
crop’s direct payments by the ratio of the crop’s
base acres to total planted acres in the county. A
farm’s total direct payment was obtained by
multiplying its county’s direct payment per
planted acre times the farm’s acres planted to
corn, grain sorghum, soybeans, and wheat.
Each farm is assumed to have only one
payment entity. SURE payments are capped at
$100,000 because payments from the Livestock
Indemnity, Livestock Forage Disaster, and
Emergency Assistance for Livestock, Honey
Bees, and Farm-Raised Fish programs were not
modeled. Again, this assumption means that
payments from SURE are overstated.
Results
Payments from Risk Management Programs
When interpreting the results, it is important to
keep in mind that the farm observations are not
from a random sample. Thus, the results cannot
be extrapolated beyond the farms in this study.
Nevertheless, the results are of interest because of
the use of farm-level yields, the importance of
Illinois and Kansas in the production of farm
program crops, and the different weather patterns
andsoils inthesetwostates. Thelatter is reflected
in markedly higher yield variability on the Kan-
sas farms (see Table 4). For example, across all
years and all farms, the standard deviation of the
ratio of a farm’s yield divided by its Olympic
average yield for the five prior crops was 46% for
Kansas soybeans vs. 15% for Illinois soybeans.
Given the different variability in farm yields, it
is not surprising that payments from 75% CRCP
varied substantively between the two states. An-
nual insurance payments averaged $2,329 per
Table 3. Number and Share of Counties Declared a Disaster County by the Secretary of




Year Illinois Kansas U.S. Illinois Kansas U.S.
2005 102 97 2306 100% 92% 73%
2006 45 105 2268 44% 100% 72%
2007 82 101 2510 80% 96% 80%
2008 94 66 2580 92% 63% 82%
Average 81 92 2416 79% 88% 77%
a Total numbers of counties by area are Illinois, 102; Kansas, 105; and U.S. states, 3,141.
Sources: Data from U.S. Department of Agriculture, Farm Service Agency.
4Failed acres were obtained from USDA, FSA for
the 1995–2008 crops. For the 1991–1994 crops, failed
acres were estimated for state s and year t using the
following linear regression and data for 1995–2008:
failed acres,t 5 f(planted acress,t – harvested acress,t).
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Table 5). These are gross indemnities and not net
of farmer-paid premiums. Given that the crop
farm is the observation unit in this study, a rea-
sonable insurance is enterprise insurance. Enter-
prise insurance includes all acres planted to a crop
within a county. Based on provisions in the 2008
Farm Bill, the premium subsidy for enterprise
insurance at the 75% coverage level is 77%
(Barnaby, 2010a). Assuming enterprise insurance
and actuarially fair insurance premiums over the
study period, net insurance payments, excluding
administrative and service fees, were $1,793 per
year for Illinois farms and $7,572 per year for
Kansas farms. Compared with the crop receipts
calculated for the farms in this study, these net
insurance indemnities are 0.6% and 5.2% for the
Illinois and Kansas farms, respectively. Receipts
for an individual crop on a given farm were cal-
culated as follows: state average price for the crop
marketing year times the farm’s yield per planted
acre times the acres planted to the crop. Receipts
for the farm were summed across the farm’s corn,
grain sorghum, soybeans, and wheat crops.
SURE’s relative importance across the two
states depends on the comparison metric. An-
nual SURE payments averaged $1,087 per Illi-
nois farm vs. $1,702 per Kansas farm (see Table
5). However, SURE payments were a greater
percentage addition to insurance payments in
Illinois: 46.7% of 75% CRCP payments for the
Illinois farms vs. 17.3% for the Kansas farms.
ACRE’s 30% reduction in loan rates resulted
in no marketing loan payments because the
market prices observed for all crops and years
exceeded the ACRE marketing loan rates. ACRE
revenue payments
5 averaged $7,093 per year for
the Illinois farms in this study vs. $3,392 for the
Kansas farms in this study (see Table 5). The
relative roles of ACRE and 75% CRCP were
reversed in the two states. For Illinois farms,
ACRE revenue payments averaged slightly over
three times larger than gross indemnities from
75% CRCP. In contrast, for Kansas farms, gross
insurance indemnities were almost three times
larger than ACRE revenue payments.
This counterfactual analysis assumes the
traditional farm program suite does not exist.
However, under the 2008 Farm Bill, farmers
can choose the traditional or ACRE farm pro-
gram suites. To provide perspective on this
choice, the 20% reduction in direct payments
required to participate in the ACRE programs
was estimated. It averaged $3,558 per year for
the Illinois farms and $3,420 per year for the
Kansas farms in this study. Thus, net ACRE
revenue payments averaged $3,535 per year for
the Illinois farms and 2$28 per year for the
Kansas farms. Although not the focus of this
article, these net ACRE revenue payments are
consistent with the relative shares of Illinois
and Kansas FSA farms that elected the ACRE
program suite in 2009: 17% for Illinois and 2%
for Kansas (USDA, FSA, 2009).
Unsurprisingly, given the preceding dis-
cussion, ACRE had a relatively greater impact
Table 4. Average and Standard Deviation of the
Ratio of a Farm’s Yield Divided by the Farm’s
Olympic Average Yield for the 5 Prior Crop
Years, Selected Crops, Illinois and Kansas,
1996–2007 Crop Years








Dryland corn 109% 38%
Irrigated corn 105% 20%
Grain sorghum 106% 43%
Soybeans 105% 46%
Wheat 104% 50%
a The average and standard deviation are calculated across all
years and all farms included in the data set for a crop and state.
b NumberoffarmsintheIllinois dataset is 560.Allplantedcorn
and soybeans; 115 had enough information on wheat yields to
be included in the analysis for at least 1 of the 12 years.
c Number of farms in the Kansas data set is 482. Numbers of
Kansas farms by crop are dryland corn (103), irrigated corn
(42), grain sorghum (168), soybeans (235), and wheat (326).
Sources: Original calculations using data from the Illinois
Farm Business Farm Management (FBFM) program and the
Kansas Farm Management Association (KFMA).
5ACRE state revenue payments were made as
follows: Illinois corn (1997–1999, 2005), Illinois
soybeans (1998–2000), Illinois wheat (1996, 1998),
Kansas dryland corn (1999, 2000, 2002, 2003), Kansas
irrigated corn (1998, 1999), Kansas grain sorghum
(1998–2000, 2002, 2003), Kansas soybeans (1998–
2002), and Kansas wheat (1996, 2004).
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Illinois farms, whereas the reverse was found
for the Kansas farms (see Table 6). When added
to the estimated cash receipts from the crops
included in this study, average annual mini-
mum farm revenue increased by 5% for the
Illinois farms when ACRE was included com-
pared with a 2% increase when 75% CRCP was
included. For the Kansas farms, average mini-
mum revenue increased 24% with 75% CRCP
compared with 11% with ACRE. Note that al-
though the average dollar amount of ACRE
revenue payments was greater in Illinois, the
relative impact of the ACRE payments on
minimum revenue was greater in Kansas.
When viewed as a supplement to crop in-
surance, SURE increased average minimum
farm revenue by one percentage point for the
Illinois farms and by three percentage points
for the Kansas farms. Also, for both the Illinois
and Kansas farms, the combination of ACRE
and 75% CRCP increased average minimum
farm revenue by more percentage points than
the combination of 75% CRCP and SURE.
Overlap in Payments between ACRE and Crop
Revenue Insurance
In determining payments by SURE, crop in-
surance indemnity payments and ACRE reve-
nue payments are added to the farm’s realized
revenue. This addition is intended to prevent
a farmer or landowner from receiving multiple
payments from the Federal government for the
same loss.
6 No such adjustment occurs when
Table 5. Estimated per Farm Average Annual Crop Receipts and Gross Payments by Risk














Corn $191,031 $1,277 $4,436
Soybeans $119,797 $977 $2,730
Wheat $18,999 $658 $265
Kansas
e
Dryland corn $109,821 $3,668 $1,513
Irrigated corn $162,784 $2,524 $1,021
Grain sorghum $47,744 $3,133 $1,659
Soybeans $87,743 $5,393 $4,357
Wheat $73,772 $7,554 $462
All Crops
Illinois farms $313,006 $2,329 $1,087 $7,093
Kansas farms $146,969 $9,834 $1,702 $3,392
All farms $236,202 $5,801 $1,371 $5,381
aReceipts for an individual crop on a given farm were estimated as follows: state average price for the crop marketing year times
the farm’s yield per planted acre times the acres planted to the crop. Receipts for the farm were summed across corn, grain
sorghum, soybeans, and wheat planted on the farm.
b The insurance product was 75% Crop Revenue Coverage.
c Calculation of ACRE payments for each crop–state combination does not include the impact of the limit on ACRE payments
per payment entity. The payment limit for one payment entity is included in the calculation of ACRE payments for the farm.
d Number of farms in the Illinois data set is 560. All planted corn and soybeans; 115 had enough information on wheat yields to
be included in the analysis for at least 1 of the 12 years.
e Number of farms in the Kansas data set is 482. Numbers of Kansas farms by crop are dryland corn (103), irrigated corn (42),
grain sorghum (168), soybeans (235), and wheat (326).
Sources: Original calculations using data from the Illinois Farm Business Farm Management (FBFM) program, the Kansas Farm
Management Association (KFMA), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistical Service.
6For the farms and years in this study, not sub-
tracting ACRE payments from SURE payments would
increase SURE payments by 74%, from $17.1 to $29.8
million. Not subtracting 75% CRCP payments from
SURE payments would increase SURE payments by
181%, from $17.1 to $48.1 million.
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cern exists over the potential for overlapping
payments by crop insurance and ACRE.
In the context of this study, one approach to
examining this concern is to compare payments
from 75% CRCP and ACRE. When both pro-
grams make payments to the same crop in the
same crop year, the smaller of the two pay-
ments is the overlap in payments. Summed
across all crops, years, farms, and states, this
measure of the overlap in payments equals 22%
of ACRE revenue payments (see Table 7).
However, this measure misses an important
consideration. Just because both insurance and
ACRE make a payment to the same crop in the
same crop year does not mean that the payments
are for the same loss. The two payments may be
for different losses that result from coverage of
different parts of the revenue risk distribution.
To illustrate, assume that the distribution of
expected revenue for a crop and crop year are
identical for the farm and state. Also assume
that the farm’s mean expected revenue equals
the state’s mean expected revenue equals the
product of the crop’s preplant insurance price
times the farm’s APH insurance yield (i.e.,
the farm’s revenue insurance guarantee) equals
the farm’s ACRE benchmark revenue equals the
product of the state’s 5-year Olympic moving
average yield times the U.S. 2-year moving av-
erage price. Last, assume that realized revenue
for the farm and state is 50% less than their
mean expected revenue.
Given these assumptions, 75% CRCP will
make payments because revenue is less than 75%
of the farm’s revenue insurance guarantee, which
also equals the farm’s expected revenue. ACRE
also will make payments because the state’s
ACRE revenue is less than the state’s ACRE
revenue risk assistance level and because the
farm’s revenue is less than the farm’s benchmark
revenue. However, the ACRE state revenue pay-
ment is capped at 25% of the state’s ACRE rev-
enue risk assistance level. Given the assumptions
in this situation, the ACRE state revenue payment
reaches its 25% cap when realized state ACRE
revenue equals 67.5% of the state’s expected
revenue (90% minus [25% times 90%]).
Thus, in this situation, only ACRE will
make payments for the farm’s shortfall in rev-
enue that lie between 75% and 90% of the
farm’s expected revenue. Only 75% CRCP will
Table 6. Impact of Revenue Risk Management Programs on Average Minimum Revenue per Farm,

































Panel A: dollars per farm
Illinoisc $192,869 $196,639 $199,576 $202,973 $206,593 $209,745
Kansasd $68,921 $85,748 $87,699 $76,373 $92,321 $94,311
Panel B: percent increase relative to crop receipts
Illinois
c 12% 13% 15% 17% 19%
Kansas
d 124% 127% 111% 134% 137%
aReceipts for an individual crop on a farm were estimated by multiplying state average price for the crop marketing year by the
farm’s yield per planted acre for the crop marketing year times the farm’s planted acres. Receipts for the farm were summed
across corn, grain sorghum, soybeans, and wheat planted on the farm.
b CRCP is Crop Revenue Coverage Insurance. Net insurance indemnities were calculated assuming that the farm operator or
landlord elected enterprise unit insurance and that insurance premiums were fair over the study period. Based on provisions in
the 2008 Farm Bill, the premium subsidy for enterprise crop insurance at the 75% coverage level is 77% (Barnaby, 2010a).
c Number of farms in the Illinois data set is 560. All planted corn and soybeans; 115 had enough information on wheat yields to
be included in the analysis for at least 1 of the 12 years.
d Number of farms in the Kansas data set is 482. Numbers of Kansas farms by crop are dryland corn (103), irrigated corn (42),
grain sorghum (168), soybeans (235), and wheat (326).
Sources: Original calculations using data from the Illinois Farm Business FarmManagement (FBFM) program, the Kansas Farm
Management Association (KFMA), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistical Service.
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enue that lie between 50% and 67.5% of the
farm’s expected revenue. Both ACRE and 75%
CRCP will make payments for the farm’s
shortfall in revenue between 67.5% and 75% of
the farm’s expected revenue. Hence, although
both 75% CRCP and ACRE make payments to
the same crop in the same crop years in this
stylized situation, most of the payments cover
different parts of the revenue risk distribution
and thus do not overlap from a risk manage-
ment perspective. It is the overlap in payments
for the same part of the revenue risk distribu-
tion that is the key policy issue.
Estimation of the overlap in payments from
ACRE and crop revenue insurance that result
from an overlap in coveringthe same part ofthe
revenue risk distribution requires a complex
simulation analysis. Among the factors that
need to be taken into account are the mean,
variance, and other moments of the state and
farm revenue distributions as well as the cov-
erage level of insurance elected by the farmer.
However, this illustration suggests that, in the
context of this study, a simple approximation to
the amount of overlap in payments from 75%
CRCP and ACRE for the same part of the
revenue risk distribution is to determine if the
payments from ACRE exceed 15% of CRCP’s
revenue guarantee. Fifteen percent is the dif-
ference between ACRE’s 90% coverage level
and CRCP’s 75% coverage level modeled in
this study. In other words, did ACRE payments
exceed the 25% deductible of 75% CRCP
taking into account ACRE’s 10% deductible?
Summed across all crops, years, farms, and
states, this measure is estimated to be 3% of
ACRE revenue payments (see Table 7), much
smaller than the earlier estimate of a 22%
overlap in payments. The finding of a small
estimated overlap in payments resulting from
an overlap in coverage of the same part of the
revenue risk distribution is consistent with
Barnaby’s (2010b) argument.
Summary and Discussion of Policy Issues
The 2008 Farm Bill authorized a new disaster
assistance program, SURE, and a new farm pro-
gram option, ACRE. Like crop revenue insurance,
Table 7. Measures of Average Annual per Farm Overlap Between ACRE and 75% Coverage Crop




Overlap in ACRE and
75% CRCP Payments
for Same Crop Year
ACRE Payment Exceeding
15% of CRCP Guarantee
for Same Crop Year
Illinoisa
Corn $4,436 $560 $0
Soybeans $2,730 $118 $6
Wheat $265 $109 $1
Kansasb
Dryland corn $1,513 $925 $0
Irrigated corn $1,021 $120 $0
Sorghum $1,659 $969 $0
Soybeans $4,357 $2,328 $733
Wheat $462 $180 $0
All crops
Illinois farms $7,093 $691 $6
Kansas farms $3,392 $1,803 $358
All farms $5,381 $1,205 $180
a Number of farms in the Illinois data set is 560. All planted corn and soybeans; 115 had enough information on wheat yields to
be included in the analysis for at least 1 of the 12 years.
b Number of farms in the Kansas data set is 482. Numbers of Kansas farms by crop are dryland corn (103), irrigated corn (42),
grain sorghum (168), soybeans (235), and wheat (326).
Sources: Original calculations using data from the Illinois Farm Business Farm Management (FBFM) program, the Kansas Farm
Management Association (KFMA), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistical Service.
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manage revenue risk. This study examines the
interactions among these three revenue risk
management programs using farm level data from
Illinois and Kansas for the 1991–2007 crops.
Insurance is modeled as 75% coverage
CRCP. Average annual gross indemnities from
75% CRCP varied substantively between the
two states: $9,834 per Kansas farm vs. $2,329
per Illinois farm. Moreover, payments by 75%
CRCP increased average minimum farm reve-
nue by 24% for the Kansas farms in this study,
but only by 2% for the Illinois farms in this
study. These stark differences can be explained,
at least in part, by the greater idiosyncratic
farm-level yield risk in Kansas.
During the 2008 Farm Bill debate, a ratio-
nale often stated by corn belt farmers for sup-
porting ACRE was that neither crop insurance
nor the counter-cyclical program addressed the
revenue risks they faced, especially with mar-
ket prices above the counter-cyclical target
prices. Since its introduction in the 2002 crop
year, the counter-cyclical program has made
payments in only 2 years (2004 and 2005) to
only two of the crops examined in this study
(corn and grain sorghum) (USDA, FSA, 2010).
In contrast, over the 2002–2008 crop years,
counter-cyclical payments have been made in
each year to cotton, in all but 1 year to peanuts,
and in 4 years to rice. The much larger impact
of 75% CRCP on the Kansas farms than on the
Illinois farms in this study and the history of
counter-cyclical payments are both consistent
with the policy dynamics that characterized the
debate on ACRE.
ACRE seeks to address holes that exist in
the current farm safety net. A hole of particular
concern is a large decline in revenue that ex-
tends over several years when prices are above
themarketing loan rate and the counter-cyclical
target price. This study estimates that ACRE
will provide more payments to Illinois farms
than to Kansas farms. ACRE also increased the
average annual minimum revenue level of Il-
linois farms by more than crop insurance and
SURE combined. Thus, this study finds that
ACRE addresses at least some of the regional
disparity that has existed within the traditional
farm safety net programs.
Concern exists that ACRE revenue pay-
ments duplicate payments from revenue in-
surance. Although both programs can make
payments to the same crop in the same year, the
payments may not be for the same part of the
revenue risk distribution. A simple estimate is
made of the amount of the overlap in payments
from ACRE and 75% CRCP associated with an
overlap in covering the same part of the reve-
nue risk distribution. This overlap in payments
is estimated to be less than 5% of ACRE pay-
ments. It is important to note that the overlap is
dependent on the insurance coverage level with
the overlap expected to be larger at higher in-
surance coverage levels and smaller at lower
insurance coverage levels.
Turning to policy recommendations for
improving the farm safety net, the farm finan-
cial crisis of the 1980s and other financial cri-
ses reveal that timely delivery of assistance is
important to help recipient businesses survive
a disaster. SURE’s ability to help farmers suf-
fering from physical production disasters
would be enhanced by making SURE payments
at the same time as insurance payments rather
than waiting until after the crop year ends. This
objective could be implemented by using crop
insurance harvest prices instead of crop mar-
keting year prices when determining SURE
payments. This policy change was estimated to
reduce SURE payments to the farms in this
study by 35%. The reduction occurred because
harvest insurance futures prices are, on aver-
age, higher than the marketing year’s average
cash price as a result of the normal basis dif-
ferential that exists between futures and cash
prices. Thus, this proposed policy change
would not only result in more timely disaster
assistance payments, but also notable budget
savings. ACRE would continue to provide as-
sistance for postharvest revenue risk factors.
However, it would be necessary to take SURE
payments into account when determining
ACRE payments to maintain the budget sav-
ings that result from the current requirement to
add ACRE payments to farm revenue when
calculating SURE payments.
This study finds that ACRE increased av-
erage minimum farm revenue to both Illinois
and Kansas farmers. Of particular note, ACRE
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the Kansas farms by 10 percentage points
above their average minimum revenue with
75% CRCP. Thus, a farm program designed to
help farmers manage systemic revenue risk had
risk management value to farmers, even where
idiosyncratic yield risk was substantial.
Farmers and landowners must weigh these
risk management benefits of ACRE against the
costs of electing ACRE over the traditional
farm programs. Direct payments are reduced by
20% and ACRE’s marketing loan rate is 30%
lower than the traditional marketing loan rate.
In addition, a farm eligibility condition exists
for the ACRE revenue program but not for
other farm programs.
The30%reductioninthe marketingloanrate
effectively means the ACRE program suite has
no marketing loan program because the proba-
bility that prices will ever be 30% below the
loan rate is close to if not zero. Thus, the ACRE
revenue program replaces both the marketing
loan and the counter-cyclical program. Imposing
a limit on ACRE revenue payments equal to
$65,000 plus the farm’s reduction in direct pay-
ments is consistent with ACRE replacing part
of the direct payment program and the counter-
cyclical program, which also has a $65,000 limit
on payments. However, imposing a limit on
ACRE revenue payments is not consistent with
ACRE replacing the marketing loan program,
which has no payment limit. A consistent set of
program rules would either set the ACRE mar-
keting loan rate equal to the traditional market-
ing loan rate or have no limit on ACRE revenue
payments.
7
Based on the farms, years, and program
modeled in this study, eliminating the farm
eligibility condition would have increased
ACRE payments by 10%. If the farm eligibility
condition is retained for ACRE, then calcula-
tion of ACRE’s state revenue risk assistance
level and farm revenue benchmark revenue
should be made consistent. In particular, al-
though a 10% cap and 10% cup exist on the
annual change in the ACRE state revenue as-
sistance level, no cup and cap exists on the
annual change in the ACRE farm revenue
benchmark. This inconsistency can result in
a farm not meeting ACRE’s farm eligibility
condition when an ACRE state revenue pay-
ment is made because the farm benchmark
revenue declined more than the state revenue
risk assistance level. Based on the farms, years,
and program modeled in this study, a 10% cap
and cup on the annual change in the ACRE
farm benchmark revenue would have increased
ACRE revenue payments by 4%.
In conclusion, the results of this study are
consistent with the common sense notion that
revenue risks differ by geographic area. Crop
insurance is an effective tool for addressing idi-
osyncraticyield risksuch asexistsinKansas.The
marketing loan program and counter-cyclical
programs are effective tools for addressing sur-
plus supply conditions such as continue to exist
for cotton and peanuts. However, a hole exists in
this traditional farm safety net when surplus
production is replaced by dynamic markets that
have prices above the marketing loan and
counter-cyclical support rates. In this situation,
multiple-year, sizable declines in revenue result-
ing from systemic risks can occur without the
marketing loan, counter-cyclical, or crop in-
surance programs providing effective risk man-
agement assistance. ACRE is an attempt to
address this hole in the traditional farm safety
net. ACRE may or may not be the right answer,
but the question it seeks to address remains a
key policy question as we approach the next
farm bill.
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